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In the good job I have had now for some ten years, I try to follow Justice
Brandeis' sage counsel: Resist even the irresistible invitation, conserve time for
the Court's heavy work. But when Caroline Brown and Peter Rubin asked me
to speak at this first national gathering of the American Constitution Society, I
just had to accept the invitation because the Society's mission is important to
the health and welfare of our Nation. The jurists and students assembled here
seek to advance the highest ideals of the Union our Fundamental Instrument of
Government establishes: You cherish liberty, and would make equal opportu-
nity and nondiscrimination genuinely this country's law and practice; and you
will pursue justice, so that you may thrive.1
While you are the American Constitution Society, your perspective on con-
stitutional law should encompass the world. The United States was once virtu-
ally alone in exposing laws and official acts to judicial review for constitution-
ality. But particularly in the years following World War II, many nations
installed constitutional review by courts as one safeguard against oppressive
government and stirred up majorities. 2 National, multinational, and interna-
tional human rights charters and tribunals today play a key part in a world with
increasingly porous borders. My message tonight is simply this: We are the
losers if we do not both share our experience with, and learn from others.
That message is hardly original. A prominent jurist put it this way 14 years
ago:
For nearly a century and a half, courts in the United States exercising the power of
judicial review [for constitutionality] had no precedents to look to save their own,
because our courts alone exercised this sort of authority. When many new constitu-
tional courts were created after the Second World War, these courts naturally
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1. See Deuteronomy 16:20 ("Zedek, zedek tirdof l'maan tichyeh." ["Justice, Justice shall you pur-
sue, that you may thrive.]")."
2. See generally Louis Favoreu, Constitutional Review in Europe, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
RIGHTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION ABROAD 38, 40-42, 46, 51-54, 56
(Louis Henkin & Albert J. Rosenthal eds., 1990).
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looked to decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, among other
sources, for developing their own law. But now that constitutional law is solidly
grounded in so many countries, it is time that the United States courts begin looking
to the decisions of other constitutional courts to aid in their own deliberative proc-
3
ess.
The speaker was Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist. More recently, Jus-
tice O'Connor said: "While ultimately we must bear responsibility for interpret-
ing our own laws, there is much to learn from. . . distinguished jurists [in other
places] who have given thought to the same difficult issues that we face here.A
In the value I place on comparative dialogue-on sharing with and learning
from others-I count myself an originalist in this sense. The 1776 Declaration
of Independence, you will recall, expressed concern about the opinions of other
peoples; it placed before the world the reasons why the United States of Amer-
ica (the new nation was called that in the Declaration) was impelled to separate
from Great Britain. The Declaration did so out of "a decent Respect to the
Opinions of Mankind.",5 It submitted the "Facts"--the "long Train of [the Brit-
ish Crown's] Abuses and Usurpations"-to the scrutiny of"a candid World.' 6
In writing the Constitution, the Framers looked to other systems and to
thinkers from other lands for enlightenment, and they understood that the new
nation would be bound by "the Law of Nations,",7 today called international
law. 8 Among powers granted Congress, the Framers enumerated the power
"[t]o define and punish ... Offences against the Law of Nations."
9
John Jay, one of the authors of The Federalist Papers and our first Chief
Justice, wrote in 1793 that the United States, "by taking a place among the na-
tions of the earth, [had] become amenable to the laws of nations."' 0 Eleven
years later, Chief Justice John Marshall cautioned that "an act of Congress
ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains . . . ,,11 And in 1900, the Court famously reaffirmed in
The Paquete Habana:
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by
3. William H. Rehnquist, Constitutional Courts - Comparative Remarks (1989), in GERMANY AND
ITS BASIC LAW: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE - A GERMAN-AMERICAN SYMPOSIUM 411, 412 (Paul
Kirchhof & Donald P. Kommers eds., 1993); see Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710 & n.8,
718 n. 16 (1997) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (referring to decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, which upheld a
ban on assisted suicide, and observing that "in almost every western democracy[,] it is a crime to assist a
suicide").
4. Sandra Day O'Connor, Keynote Address Before the Ninety-Sixth Annual Meeting of the Ameri-
can Society of International Law (Mar. 16, 2002), in 96 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 348, 350 (2002).
5. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE par. I (U.S. 1776).
6. Id. at para. 2.
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
8. See Harold Hongju Koh, Paying "Decent Respect" to World Opinion on the Death Penalty, 35
U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1085, 1087-90 (2002) (on Framers' understanding of term "Law of Nations").
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
10. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 474 (1793).
1I. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
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the courts of justice .... For this purpose, where there is no treaty, and no control-
ling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the cus-
toms and usages of civilized nations. 
12
To discern the rule of law among nations, the Court said in The Paquete
Habana, judges were to look "to the works of jurists and commentators, who
by years of labor, research and experience, have made themselves peculiarly
well acquainted with the subjects of which they treat."' 13
Today, tools are readily at hand to pursue international and comparative
law inquiries. The Internet affords access to foreign judicial decisions, law
journals contain all manner of commentary, course materials are well packaged.
In 1999 and 2003, leading U.S. law book publishers produced two excellent
sets of Cases and Materials on Comparative Constitutional Law.' 4 These works
should attract more teachers and students to the field. My colleague, Justice
Stephen Breyer, speaks enthusiastically of his hopes for the wired world. Audio
and visual technology in new classrooms, he notes, already permit U.S., Cana-
dian, European, or Indian professors to "team teach" classes held simultane-
ously in different nations.' 5 Technological developments, he predicts, will in-
evitably open vistas in courtrooms as well as classrooms.
True, there is a discordant view on recourse to the "Opinions of Mankind."
A mid- 19th century Chief Justice expressed that view concisely:
No one, we presume, supposes that any change in public opinion or feeling ... in
the civilized nations of Europe or in this country, should induce the court to give the
words of the Constitution a more liberal construction.., than they were intended to
bear when the instrument was framed and adopted.
16
Those words were penned in 1857. They appear in Chief Justice Roger
Taney's opinion for a divided Court in Dred Scott v. Sandford, an opinion that
invoked the majestic Due Process Clause to uphold one individual's right to
hold another in bondage.'
7
Jurists identified as today's originalists adhere to the view that a compara-
tive perspective, though useful in the framing of our Constitution, is inappro-
priate to its interpretation.! 8 Partisans of that view sometimes carry the day in
our courts. I anticipate, however, that they will speak increasingly in dissent.
Two cases in point. In 1989, in Stanford v. Kentucky,19 the Court held it was
not "cruel and unusual punishmen[t]" under the Eighth Amendment to sentence
12. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700(1900).
13. Id.
14. NORMAN DORSEN ETAL., COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: CASES AND MATERIALS
(2003); VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1999).
15. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Mensaje del Juez Stephen Breyer en la Rededicaci6n del Edificio de
la Escuela de Derecho de la Universidad de Puerto Rico, 70 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 1015, 1017 (2001).
16. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 426 (1857).
17. ld. at 450-52.
18. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.11 (1997).
19. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
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an individual to death for a crime committed at age 16 or 17. Rejecting the
relevance of "the sentencing practices of other countries," the Court "empha-
size[d] that it is American conceptions of decency that are dispositive." 20 Thir-
teen years later, in Atkins v. Virginia,21 the Court held that executions of men-
tally retarded criminals are "cruel and unusual punishments" prohibited by the
Eighth Amendment.22 The six-member majority noted that "within the world
community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by men-
tally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved.,
23
In a 1996 address at American University, Chief Justice Rehnquist said:
"The framers of the United States Constitution came up with two quite original
ideas. ' 24 The first was "a chief executive who [is] not responsible to the legisla-
ture, as a Chief Executive is under the parliamentary system. ' 25 The separation
of legislative and executive authority established under Articles I and II of the
U.S. Constitution, the Chief Justice noted, has not been embraced by many
other nations. 26 But the second idea--"an independent judiciary with the au-
thority to declare laws passed by Congress unconstitutional"-"has caught on
[abroad], particularly since the end of the Second World War. ' 27 Of that idea,
the Chief Justice said: Constitutional review by independent tribunals of justice
"is one of the crown jewels of our system of government today. ' 28
I agree, but the just pride we take in our system of constitutional review,
also in our judicially enforceable Bill of Rights, hardly means we should rest
content with our current jurisprudence and have little to learn from others. May
I suggest two areas in which, as I see it, we could do better. One concerns the
dynamism with which we interpret our Constitution, and similarly, our com-
mon law. The other involves the extraterritorial application of fundamental
rights.
Chief Justice Taney, in the passage I earlier quoted,29 described a constitu-
tional text frozen in time. Contrast the view stated in Trop v. Dulles,30 a path-
marking 1958 plurality opinion. That case concerned the proper reading of the
Eighth Amendment's ban on "cruel and unusual punishments." Those words,
the opinion said, "must draw [their] meaning from the evolving standards of
20. Id. at 369 n.1.
21. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
22. Id. at 307, 321.
23. Id. at 316 n.21.
24. William H. Rehnquist, Keynote Address at the Symposium on The Future of the Federal Courts
(Apr. 9, 1996), in 46 AM. U. L. REv. 263, 273 (1996).
25. Id. at 273-74.
26. Id. at 274.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
30. 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion).
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decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." 31 As the 2002 decision
banning execution of the mentally retarded (Atkins v. Virginia) expressly reaf-
firmed,32 a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court Justices generally adhere to that
understanding. But the "frozen-in-time" position occasionally holds sway.
A recent example, involving no grand constitutional question, simply equity
between parties with no ideological score to settle: A Mexican company de-
faulted on payments due a U.S. creditor and was sued in a Federal District
Court, which had personal jurisdiction over the debtor.33 Sliding into insol-
vency, the Mexican company was busily distributing what remained of its as-
sets to its Mexican creditors. It did so in clear violation of a contractual promise
to treat the U.S. creditor on a par with all other unsecured, unsubordinated
creditors. If that activity continued, nothing would be left in the till for the U.S.
creditor.
34
Since 1975, English courts had been providing a remedy in similar circum-
stances.35 To assure that there would be assets against which a final judgment
for the creditor could be executed, they would order a temporary injunction re-
straining the foreign debtor from transferring assets pending adjudication of the
creditor's claim.36 The U.S. District Court, ruling over two decades later,
looked to the English practice, which other common law nations had by then
adopted, and found it altogether fitting for the U.S. creditor's case against the
Mexican debtor. At the hearing on the preliminary injunction, the District
Judge asked: "We have got a case where... no [plausible] defense [is] pre-
sented, why shouldn't I be able to provide [the creditor] with [injunctive] re-
lief?" 37 Why should the debtor be allowed "to use the process of the court to
delay entry of a judgment as to which there is no defense? Why is that equita-
ble? , 3
8
Overturning a Second Circuit decision that affirmed the preliminary asset-
freeze order,39 a 5-4 majority of the Supreme Court, in 1999, answered the Dis-
trict Judge's questions this way: Injunctions of the kind at issue (called Mareva
injunctions, the short name of the 1975 English case that first approved the
practice) were not "traditionally accorded by courts of equity" at the time the
31. Id. at 101.
32. 536 U.S. 304, 311-12 (2002).
33. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 311-12 (1999).
34. Id. at 310, 312.
35. See id. at 327; id. at 339 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
36. See Mareva Compania Naviera S.A- v. Int'l Bulkcarriers S.A., 2 Lloyd's Rep. 509, 510-11
(C.A. 1975).
37. App. to Pet. for Cert. at 34a, quoted in Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 341-42 (Ginsburg, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).
38. App. to Pet. for Cert. at 36a, quoted in Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 342 (Ginsburg, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
39. See Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., v. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A., 143 F.3d 688 (2d Cir.
1998).
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Constitution was adopted. 40 "[A]ny substantial expansion of [1789] practice,"
the Court said, was the prerogative of Congress. 41 A power that English courts
of equity "did not actually exercise ... until 1975," the Court concluded, was
42
not one U.S. courts could assume.
Joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, I dissented from the Court's
static conception of equitable remedial authority.43 Earlier decisions described
that authority as supple, adaptable to changing conditions. I noted, among other
things, that federal courts, in their sometimes heroic efforts to implement the
public school desegregation mandated by Brown v. Board of Education,44 did
not embrace a frozen-in-time view of their equitable authority.45 Issuing de-
crees "beyond the contemplation of the 18th-century Chancellor,' 6 they ap-
plied the enduring principles of equity to the changing needs of a society still in
the process of achieving "a more perfect Union."
47
Turning from frozen-in-time interpretation to another shortfall, the Bill of
Rights, few would disagree, is our nation's hallmark and pride. One might as-
sume, therefore, that it guides and controls U.S. officialdom wherever in the
world they carry our flag or their credentials. But that is not our current juris-
prudence. For example, absent an express ban by treaty, a U.S. officer may ab-
duct a foreigner and forcibly transport him to the United States to stand trial
here. The Court so held, 6-3, in 1992.48 Just a year earlier, South Africa's high-
est court had ruled the other way, determining that "abduction [violates] the
applicable rules of international law. ' 49
Another example, this one involving civil litigation: Interpreting Supreme
Court precedent, the D.C. Circuit held in 1989, during my time on that court
and over my dissent, that foreign plaintiffs, acting abroad-plaintiffs were In-
dian family planning organizations-had no First Amendment rights and there-
fore no standing to assert a violation of such rights by U.S. officials. 50 In dis-
sent, I resisted the notion that in an encounter between the United States and
non-resident aliens, "the amendment we prize as 'first' has no force in court.
51
I expressed the expectation that the position taken in the Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Relations would one day accurately describe our law. "[W]herever the
40. Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 319; see id. at 327, 333.
41. 1d. at 329.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 336-37 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
44. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
45. Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 337 n.4 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
46. Id. at 337.
47. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
48. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 670 (1992).
49. State v. Ebrahim, 1991 (2) SALR 553, 568 (A), quoted in Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 687
n.36 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
50. DKT Mem'l Fund Ltd. v. Agency for Int'l Dev., 887 F.2d 275, 284-85 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
51. Id. at 308 (R.B. Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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United States acts," the Restatement projects, "'it can only act in accordance
with the limitations imposed by the Constitution.'
52
With human rights increasingly prominent on the world's agenda, that day
may come sooner rather than later. The idea was well stated by distinguished
Columbia University Professor Louis Henkin when he wrote:
[11n a world of states, the United States is not in a position to secure the rights of all
individuals everywhere, [but] it is always in a position to respect them. Our federal
government must not invade the individual rights of any human being. The choice
in the Bill of Rights of the word "person" rather than "citizen" was not fortuitous;
nor was the absence of a geographical limitation. Both reflect a commitment to re-
spect the individual rights of all human beings.
53
In celebration of the Supreme Court of Canada's 125th anniversary three
years ago, I remarked on the impressive human rights decisions that court has
made since the 1982 adoption of Canada's Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
54
Interpreting the Charter, Canada's Supreme Court, as of 1996, had referred in
some 50 cases to international human rights instruments. 55 In contrast, since the
United Nations' 1948 adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
the U.S. Supreme Court has mentioned that basic international Declaration a
56
spare six times-and only twice in a majority decision.
But our "island" or "lone ranger" mentality is beginning to change. Our
Justices, as I noted at the start of these remarks, are becoming more open to
comparative and international law perspectives. The term just ended may prove
a milestone in that regard. New York Times reporter Linda Greenhouse ob-
served in her annual roundup of the Court's decisions: The Court has "dis-
played a [steadily growing] attentiveness to legal developments in the rest of
the world and to the [C]ourt's role in keeping the United States in step with
them.
, 57
In the Michigan affirmative action cases,58 in separate opinions, joined in
52. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 721 note 1 (1987) (quoting from Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 6 (1957) (plurality opinion of Black, J.))).
53. Louis Henkin, The Constitution as Compact and as Conscience: Individual Rights Abroad and
at Our Gates, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 11, 32 (1985).
54. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks for Celebration of the 125th Anniversary of the Supreme Court
of Canada (Sept. 28, 2000) (on file with author).
55. See Louis LeBel & Gloria Chao, The Rise of International Law in Canadian Constitutional
Litigation: Fugue or Fusion? Recent Developments and Challenges in Internalizing International Law,
16 SuP. CT. L. REv. 23, 45 (2002); Gdrard V. La Forest, The Expanding Role of the Supreme Court of
Canada in International Law Issues, 34 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 89, 90-91 (1996).
56. See Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 996 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certio-
rari); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 521 n.14 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Zemel v. Rusk,
381 U.S. 1, 4, 15 n.13 (1965) (majority opinion); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 161
n.16 (1963) (majority opinion); Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 776 (1960) (Douglas,
J., concurring); Am. Fed'n of Labor v. Am. Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538, 549 n.5 (1948) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring).
57. Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court: Overview; In a Momentous Term, Justices Remake the
Law, andthe Court, N.Y. TIMES,July 1, 2003, at Al.
58. Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
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one case by Justice Breyer,5 9 in the other in full by Justice Souter and in part by
Justice Breyer,60 I looked to two United Nations Conventions:61 the 1965 Inter-
national Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination,
which the United States has ratified 62; and the 1979 Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,63 which, sadly, the United
States has not yet ratified.64 Both Conventions distinguish between impermissi-
ble policies of oppression or exclusion, and permissible policies of inclusion,
"temporary special measures aimed at accelerating de facto equality." 65 The
Court's decision in the Law School case, I observed, "accords with the interna-
tional understanding of the office of affirmative action."
66
A better indicator, because it attracted a majority, is Justice Kennedy's
opinion for the Court in Lawrence v. Texas,67 announced June 26, 2003. Over-
ruling the Court's 1986 decision in Bowers v. Hardwick,68 Lawrence declared
unconstitutional a Texas statute prohibiting two adult persons of the same sex
from engaging, voluntarily, in certain intimate sexual conduct. On the question
of dynamic versus static, frozen-in-time constitutional interpretation, the
Court's opinion instructs:
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment
or the Fourteenth Amendment known the components of liberty in its manifold pos-
sibilities, they might have been more specific. They did not presume to have this in-
sight. They knew times can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see
that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the
Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their
own search for greater freedom.69
And on respect for "the Opinions of [Human]kind," the Court emphasized:
"The right the petitioners seek in this case has been accepted as an integral part
of human freedom in many other countries." 70 In support, the Court cited the
leading 1981 European Court of Human Rights decision, Dudgeon v. United
Kingdom,71 and follow-on European Human Rights Court decisions affirming
the protected right of homosexual adults to engage in intimate, consensual con-
59. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2347 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
60. Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2442 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
61. See id. at 2445; Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2347.
62. Annex to G.A. Res. 2106, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, at 47, U.N. Doc. A/6014
(1965); see DEPT. OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 449-50 (2000).
63. Annex to G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 194, U.N. Doc. A/34/46
(1979) [hereinafter CEDAW].
64. See Malvina Halberstam, United States Ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of all
Forms ofDiscrimination Against Women, 31 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & EcON. 49, 50 (1997).
65. CEDAW, supra note 63, at art. 4(1).
66. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2347 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
67. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
68. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
69. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484.
70. Id. at 2483.




Recognizing that forecasts are risky, I nonetheless believe we will continue
to accord "a decent Respect to the Opinions of [Human]kind" as a matter of
comity and in a spirit of humility. Comity, because projects vital to our well be-
ing-combating international terrorism is a prime example-require trust and
cooperation of nations the world over. And humility because, in Justice
O'Connor's words: "Other legal systems continue to innovate, to experiment,
and to find new solutions to the new legal problems that arise each day, from
which we can learn and benefit."
73
In conclusion, my cheers as you undertake the challenging mission to sup-
port and nurture the Constitution, as it has evolved over the span of two centu-
ries and more. The time is right for that mission. As Abigail Adams wrote to
her son of the era in which he was coming of age, "These are the times in
which a genius would wish to live. It is not in the still calm of life, or the repose
of a pacific station, that great characters are formed. The habits of a vigorous
mind are formed in contending with difficulties."
74
72. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2483.
73. Sandra Day O'Connor, Broadening Our Horizons: Why American Judges and Lawyers Must
Learn About Foreign Law, INT'L JUD. OBSERVER, June 1997, at 2.
74. Letter from Abigail Adams to John Quincy Adams, quoted in DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN
ADAMS 226 (2001).

